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Abstract
This paper examines the resource curse hypothesis both within and between countries of
different democratic footprint, based on a dynamic model that properly accounts for endo-
geneity issues. To achieve that, we apply a panel Vector Auto-Regressive (PVAR) approach
along with panel impulse response functions to data on oil dependence variables, economic
growth and several political institutional variables in 76 countries classified by different in-
come groupings and level of development, over the period 1980-2012. Our results suggest
that controlling for the quality of political institutions, and in particular the constraints to
the executives, is important in rendering the resource curse hypothesis significant. Doing so,
the resource curse hypothesis is documented mainly for developing economies and medium-
high income countries. Specifically, when economies from the aforementioned groups are
characterised by weak quality of political institutions, then oil dependence is not growth-
enhancing.
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1 Introduction
In their 1995 influential study titled “Natural resource abundance and economic growth”, Sachs
and Warner started a well-known line of research focusing on natural resources. They obtained
a negative conditional relationship between economic growth and resource dependence using a
cross section of international data, in line with the resource curse hypothesis. More specifically,
they report that economies with abundant natural resources tend to experience lower economic
growth compared to economies with scarce natural resources. Sachs and Warner (1999, 2001),
Gylfason et al. (1999) and Rodriguez and Sachs (1999), among many others, also find a negative
relationship between growth and resource abundance or dependence.1 However, the evidence in
favour of the resource curse hypothesis is by no means conclusive (see, for example, Raddatz,
2007; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Alexeev and Conrad, 2009; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke,
2010, among others).2 Alexeev and Conrad (2009), for example, demonstrate that high endow-
ments of oil have a positive effect on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), contradicting
most of the empirical literature on the resource curse, while Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008)
find that resource dependence does not negatively affect growth and they define the resource
curse as a red herring. However, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) challenge these results
explaining that ignoring the volatility channel may lead to conclude that there is no resource
curse. These authors find that while resource exports boosts growth in stable countries, they
make especially volatile economies even more volatile, worsening growth opportunities in these
countries.
In this study we re–examine the resource curse hypothesis in an attempt to shed more
light into that field. The resource curse hypothesis literature reveals the following empirical
regularities.
First, natural resource abundance is associated with various negative development outcomes
(Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999, 2001; Bru¨ckner, 2010), although the opposite evidence is still
present (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009).
Second, existing explanations for the resource curse do not adequately account for the role of
social forces or external political and economic environments in shaping development outcomes
in resource abundant countries, nor for the fact that, while most resource abundant countries
have performed poorly in developmental terms (i.e., the cases of Angola and Congo, rich in oil,
or the group of OPEC countries) a few have done quite well (i.e., Norway).
1Previously, Gelb (1988) and Auty (2002) also documented this relationship.
2See, for example, Frankel (2010) and van der Ploeg (2011) for recent surveys.
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Third, recommendations for overcoming the resource curse have not generally taken into
account the issue of political feasibility. More generally, it is argued that the basic problem
with the literature is that researchers have been too reductionist they have tended to explain
development performance solely in terms of the size and nature of countries’ natural resource
endowments. Nevertheless, a consensus is emerging that various political and social variables
mediate the relationship between natural resource wealth and development outcomes (i.e., Isham
et al., 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006a,b; Andersen and Aslaksen, 2008; Bhattacharyya and Hodler,
2010; Bjorvatn et al., 2012; Collier and Goderis, 2012; El Anshasy and Katsaiti, 2013). Even
more, most of the studies have not fully addressed the issue of endogeneity and reverse causality
between the variables of interest (Collier and Goderis, 2012). In this paper, we address all the
above issues when analyzing the resource curse hypothesis.3
Thus, more specifically, the objective of this paper is to re–examine the dynamic links of the
resource curse hypothesis both within and between countries of different democratic footprint.
To achieve this, we apply a panel Vector Auto-Regressive (PVAR) approach along with panel
impulse response functions to data on oil dependence (approximated by oil rents as a percentage
of GDP, oil share as a percentage of GDP and oil revenue per capita)4,5, economic growth and
several political institutional variables (i.e., polity IV index and its sub-indices and the political
rights index), together with additional control variables. We consider 76 countries classified by
different income groupings, level of development, as well as, their level of democracy over the
period 1980-2012.
Two are the main contributions of the paper to previous existing economic literature. First,
as far as the methodology is concerned, instead of using previous methodological approaches
such as cross-section (Sachs and Warner, 1995, and many others), panel data (Bhattacharyya
and Hodler, 2010; Boyce and Emery, 2011; Cavalcanti et al., 2011; Bjorvatn et al., 2012), panel
error correction models (Collier and Goderis, 2012) or time-varying cointegration (Apergis and
Payne, 2014) models, in this paper we estimate different panel VAR models. To our knowledge,
this is the first paper that adopts a panel VAR approach and panel impulse response analysis
to study the dynamic impact among oil dependence, the quality of political institutions, and
3In addition, related literature also considers the called “dutch disease”, where the resource exports increase
exchange rates and reduce the competitiveness of other domestic exporting sectors (i.e., Sachs and Warner, 1995;
Gylfason et al., 1999; Sala-i Martin and Subramanian, 2013), nevertheless this falls outside the scope of this paper.
4Bru¨ckner (2010) shows that the negative relationship between resource dependence and economic growth is
larger when resource dependence is calculated using a real measure of the share of natural resource exports in
GNP adjusted for cross-country differences in the prices on non-tradables.
5We concentrate on oil dependence, given that oil is one of the most consumed and tradable natural resources
IEA (2015). In addition, as suggested by Ross (2001), oil resources have antidemocratic properties.
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economic growth by taking into account the endogeneity of these variables, as well as controlling
for commonly used variables in the endogenous economic growth theory.
The advantages of using a panel VAR methodology relative to methods previously discussed
so as to examine the oil-based resource curse hypothesis are several. First, and in contrast to
cross-country, panel data models allow us to control for unobservable time-invariant country
characteristics, reducing concerns of omitted variable bias. Second, time fixed effects can also
be added to account for any global (macroeconomic) shocks that may affect all countries in the
same way. Third, the inclusion of lags of the variables helps to analyze the dynamic relationship
between the different variables. Thus, impulse response functions based on PVARs can account
for any delayed effects on and of the variables under consideration and thus determine whether
the effects between the variables of interest are short-lived, long-lived or both. Such dynamic
effects would not have been captured by panel regressions. Fourth, and most importantly,
PVARs are explicitly designed to address the endogeneity problem, which is one of the most
serious challenges of the empirical research on the resource curse hypothesis, by treating all
variables as potentially endogenous.6 Last but not least, PVARs can be effectively employed
with relative short-time series due to the efficiency gained from the cross-sectional dimension.
Our second contribution concerns the variables that are employed in this study. More specifi-
cally, we include three key variables, namely, oil dependence (proxied by three alternative indica-
tors discussed in detail in the Section 2.1.), economic growth and institutional quality, together
with other commonly used control variables that can potentially affect economic growth (i.e.,
labor force participation, gross fixed capital formation, foreign direct investment and openness).
The inclusion of all these variables, together with their interactions (please see Section 2.1. for
details), will allow us to account for the interdependencies among the quality of political insti-
tutions, economic growth and oil dependence. In order to better characterize the relationship
between these variables, we also estimate the PVAR for different sub-groups of countries based
on different characteristics, such as, income level or developing stage, so as to check whether
the impact of institutional quality and oil dependence variables on economic growth potentially
differs among each of these sub-groups of countries.
6The endogeneity problem in cross-country and panel data models has been previously addressed by the
inclusion of different instrumental variables (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009; Cotet and Tsui, 2013), and by estimating
the model using 2 or 3 Step Least Squares models (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Busse and Gro¨ning, 2013),
Generalized Method of Moments (Lederman and Maloney, 2003; Maloney and Lederman, 2008) or Arellano-Bond
Generalized Method of Moments (Yaduma et al., 2013). The difficulty in measuring good instruments of the
variables included in these types of studies, such as oil dependence and quality of institutions, better justifies the
use of panel VAR models, which help to alleviate the endogeneity problem by treating all variables as potentially
endogenous.
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Of course, the impact of the quality of the institutions and democracy on economic growth
has also been documented in many papers (Barro, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Papyrakis
and Gerlagh, 2004; Epstein et al., 2006; Glaeser et al., 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2008; Papaioannou
and Siourounis, 2008). Furthermore, the interaction between natural resources and economic
growth, taking into account the role of institutions has been also previously studied by Isham
et al. (2005), Mehlum et al. (2006a,b), Hodler (2006), Andersen and Aslaksen (2008), Bhat-
tacharyya and Hodler (2010), Bjorvatn et al. (2012), Bru¨ckner et al. (2012), Collier and Goderis
(2012) and El Anshasy and Katsaiti (2013), among many others.
Isham et al. (2005), for example, find that not only institutional quality has a significant
effect on economic growth, but it is also determined by the resource abundance of each of the
countries. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) examine the impact of natural resource abundance on
economic growth considering alternative transmission channels (corruption, investment, open-
ness, terms of trade and schooling). Despite the negative relationship between natural resource
abundance and economic growth, when these transmission channels are included, they obtain a
positive the relationship between natural resources and economic growth. Hodler (2006), on the
other hand, develop a model in which natural resources cause fighting activities between rivalling
groups, while fighting reduces productive activities and weakens property rights, and thus, pro-
duction activities. According to this author, apart from the natural resources’ direct positive
income effect, natural resources have an indirect effect on income through property rights, which
depends on how fractionalized a country is. In addition, Mehlum et al. (2006a,b) use the same
dataset as Sachs and Warner (1995), including an interaction effect between quality of institu-
tions and resource dependence, and obtain that institutional quality is the key to understand
the resource curse. They maintain that when institutions are bad, resource dependence is a
curse, while it is a blessing when institutions are good. Furthermore, Andersen and Aslaksen
(2008) analyze how public income shocks from natural resources have different long run eco-
nomic effects dependent on constitutional designs. Using data from 90 economies divided into
democratic and nondemocratic countries, they find that the form of government matters more
than the democratic rule. In a recent study, Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) also analyse both
theoretically and empirically whether and how the quality of the democratic institutions affects
the relationship between natural resources and corruption. They confirm that the relationship
between resource rents and corruption also depends on the quality of institutions.
Despite that there are some studies that have considered the quality of institutions in the link
between resource dependence or abundance and economic growth, none of these studies have
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considered the effects of the constraints to the executives. This is rather important as there
are cases where countries are autocratic, yet with strong constraints to the executive, which
reduces the powers of the autocrat and thus, these economies may be closer to be democracies.
An example of such country is Indonesia, where during the mid-60s Suharto overruled Sukarno
with coups d’e´tat, yet he was committed to maintain the property rights and investments of
the business sector. During Suhartos era the country experienced significant growth with heavy
investments in public goods and numerous reforms in the banking sector, as well as, in import
trade monopolies (Hadiz and Robison, 2005). This is one of the key innovations of the paper,
as it is the first study to examine the effects of these constraints in the context of the natural
resource hypothesis.
The results of our empirical analysis, which remain sound to several robustness checks,
reveal the following empirical regularities. A positive relationship between resource dependence
and economic growth is documented for the overall sample. Put differently, the resource curse
hypothesis is not present in the above case. However, controlling for the quality of political
institutions, and more importantly the constraints to the executives, is important in rendering
the resource curse hypothesis significant. Doing so, we find evidence of the resource curse
hypothesis, mainly for developing economies and medium-high income countries. Specifically,
when economies from the aforementioned groups are characterised by weak quality of political
institutions, then oil dependence is not growth-enhancing.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the PVAR methodol-
ogy and the data set. Empirical results based on alternative estimations are presented in Section
3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Data set and methodology
2.1 Data set
We consider an unbalanced panel of annual data from 76 countries that covers the period 1980-
2012. In total we have 1471 country-year observations. The countries included in our dataset
are listed in Table 1. Table 1 also divides our sample countries into the following subgroups that
we also examine below: developed and developing and different income groups. The variables
used in this paper are obtained from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), US
Energy Information Administration (EIA), Polity IV project and Freedom House (see Table 2
for a detailed description of our dataset and their sources).
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[Insert Table 1 about here]
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Following previous empirical related studies on natural resources that also use panel models
(see, for example, Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010; Boyce and Emery, 2011; Cavalcanti et al.,
2011; Bjorvatn et al., 2012, among others), we propose different specifications of PVAR models.
We collect the following data:
a. Economic growth. Following most of the papers, we use the annual real growth of per capita
GDP as one of our endogenous variables in the analysis, which approximates the degree of the
countries economic development.
b. Oil dependence. We use the following three alternative endogenous variables (for robustness
purposes) as proxies of oil dependence: (i) oil share as a percentage of GDP, (ii) oil rents as a
percentage of GDP and (iii) oil revenues per capita. The choice of these proxies are in line with
Arezki and Bru¨ckner (2011), Bjorvatn et al. (2012) and Apergis and Payne (2014). We interpret
these variables as a measure of the oil dependence, rather than as a measure of oil abundance,
which could be better proxied by a stock measure (see, for instance, Brunnschweiler and Bulte,
2008, for a discussion of the differences between resource abundance, resource rents and resource
dependence). Since the oil shares and the oil rents are divided by the size of the economy, this
ratio will not be independent of the economic policies carried out by each of the countries, and
thus, this variable should be treated as endogenous.
c. Quality of political institutions. Again, for robustness purposes, we use two alternative
measures of political institutional quality: (i) Polity IV index from the Polity IV project (Mar-
shall Monty et al., 2009) and (ii) Political Rights index (from the Freedom House). The Polity
IV index is a commonly used proxy for institutional quality in several studies (see, for example
Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010; Arezki and Bru¨ckner, 2011; Bjorvatn et al., 2012; Bru¨ckner
et al., 2012; El Anshasy and Katsaiti, 2013; Boschini et al., 2013; Caselli and Tesei, 2016). The
Political Rights index also approximates the quality of institutions, although it is constructed
based on the responses to different questions related to the electoral process, political pluralism
and participation and functioning of government, and it has also been used in the literature (see,
e.g., Arezki and Bru¨ckner, 2011).
d. Interaction term. Economic and political science literature tend to include an interactive
term between the quality of institutions and natural resource abundance or share. In our case,
we use an interaction term between the oil dependence and the constraints to the executives,
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so as to account for the interdependencies among the quality of political institutions, economic
growth and oil abundance. This interaction term is the third dependent/endogenous variable
that we use in the extended PVAR model.
e. Exogenous control variables. In order to avoid any potential omitted variable bias, we also
control for several exogenous variables typically used in the endogenous growth theory, namely,
labour force participation, gross fixed capital formation and openness.
2.2 PVAR
This paper uses data from 76 economies for the period 1980-2012. The PVAR methodology we
employ, originally developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), extends the traditional VAR model
introduced by Sims (1980), which treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, with the
panel-data approach, which allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity. In its general form,
the PVAR model can be expressed as follows:
Yit = A0 +A1Yit−1 +A2Yit−2 + ...+AjYit−j +BXit + µi + λt + εit (1)
where Yit is a vector of our dependent/endogenous variables, namely real per capita economic
growth and oil dependence (proxied by either oil share as a % of GDP, oil rents or oil revenue per
capita). The autoregressive structure allows all endogenous variables to enter the model with
a number of j lags. Xit is a vector of the exogenous variables (commonly used in endogenous
growth models) comprising: (i) gross fixed capital formation as a % of GDP, measuring capital
input, (ii) imports plus exports as a % of GDP, capturing the degree of openness, and (iii)
labour force participation, capturing human capital. µi accounts for the unobservable country
characteristics (country fixed-effects) and λt accounts for any global shocks that may affect all
countries in the same way (time fixed-effects). Finally, εit denotes the error term.
As indicated above, our benchmark specification is a PVAR that contains the real per capita
GDP growth rate and a proxy of oil dependence, as well as exogenous variables and country-
and time-fixed-effects, for the full sample. However, we also estimate the same model using
only autocratic countries, so as to discover if the quality of political institutions impacts on the
oil dependence-economic growth relationship. Furthermore, we extend the benchmark model to
a PVAR with the inclusion of an additional dependent/endogenous variable that captures the
effects of the constraints to the executives on the resource curse hypothesis. More specifically,
we use an interaction term between oil dependence and the ‘Regulation of Chief Executive
Recruitment’ (INTER 1; as defined in Table 2). Thus, we allow for all these variables to be
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endogenous, addressing one of the main empirical problems of the related literature.
In fact, as a first step, and in order to justify the methodology used in this paper, we pursued
Block exogeneity tests, as a test for the endogeneity/exogeneity of the key variables in the study.
A variable is said to Granger cause another variable if there is enough evidence to reject the
null hypothesis that the coefficients on the lags of the vector of variables Ykt−j in the PVAR
equation of Yit, where i 6= k, are all equal to zero. The results of this test reported in Table 3,
provide evidence of causality among the three variables (i.e., economic growth, oil dependence
and quality of institutions), suggesting that these variables should be treated as endogenous.7
This is the approach that we follow in this study.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
In order to get a more complete picture of the dynamic interactions among oil dependence,
economic growth and political institutions, we perform a panel generalised impulse-response
function (PGIRF) analysis, in order to assess the speed of adjustments to shocks originating
in our aforementioned variables. The panel generalised impulse response function analysis em-
ployed, which is based on Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), provides a natural
solution when theory does not provide a clear cut guidance on the ordering of the aforemen-
tioned endogenous variables, as in our case. Moreover, the PGIRFs are also decomposed into
the responses of shocks to specific variables by taking out from the PGIRFs the effects of shocks
to all other variables (Koop et al., 1996), which gives us further insights into the mechanisms at
work.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Descriptive statistics and causality tests
In Table 4, we present the descriptive statistics of our main variables for the full data sample (i.e.,
76 countries between 1980 and 2012). It is evident from this table that, real GDP per capita
growth averaged at 1.67% and the oil abundance variables averaged between 8.40%-10.09%.
Compared to real GDP per capita growth, the oil abundance variables are more volatile. On
average, the countries in the sample are characterised by high degree of openness (72.04%),
abundant human capital (59.87%) and moderate capital input (21.91%). According to the
7The Granger-causality results for the subsample groups, which are qualitatively similar, are available from
the authors upon request.
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panel unit root test, all series are stationary, indicating the appropriateness of using them in
the PVAR analysis.8
[Insert Table 4 about here]
3.2 Panel Generalised Impulse Response Functions: Full sample analysis
Based on the estimation of Equation (1), with a lag order of 4 determined by the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), we first calculate the generalised
panel impulse response functions tracing out the reaction of real per capita GDP growth to a
shock on oil share and vice versa.9
For brevity, we report only the PGIRFs, where a positive (negative) response of one variable
to a positive shock of another variable is depicted by a response line above (below) zero. The
two dashed lines (above and below the solid response line) show the 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 1 (Panel A) depicts the dynamic path of adjustment to a shock on oil share in
year 1 and in subsequent periods (up to 15 years) based on a PVAR model with only these
two endogenous variables, as well as the exogenous variables (i.e., labour force participation,
openness and gross fixed capital formation).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Our results indicate that oil share tends to have a positive effect on per capita real GDP
growth in the long-run (up to 15 years). Furthermore, we observe that a positive shock to the
per capita real GDP growth triggers a positive response from the oil share, yet only short-lived
(up to 2 years), as it becomes insignificant thereafter. This is suggestive of the fact that, based
on the full sample estimation, higher levels of oil share lead to higher economic growth, contrary
to the empirical evidence of the resource curse hypothesis (as in Raddatz, 2007; Alexeev and
Conrad, 2009; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). In addition, we report for the first time that
there is a feedback mechanism from economic growth to the oil share, which might suggest that
economic growth could lead to better exploitation of oil resources and thus increase the oil share
for a country, which points again to the endogeneity of the oil abundance variables in this type
of studies (Collier and Goderis, 2012).
8The results for the subgroups of countries and proxies of oil abundance and institutional quality, point towards
similar conclusions. Thus, for the sake of brevity, these are not presented but are available upon request from the
authors.
9Post-PVARs estimation of misspecification tests reveal no evidence of residual autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity. In addition, the stability conditions are satisfied. These results are available upon request from
the authors.
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In order to analyse the role of the institutions, we estimate the previous PVAR model
distinguishing between democratic and autocratic countries and the results are displayed in
Panel B of Figure 1. Interestingly enough, the response of per capita real GDP growth to a
positive shock to oil share, considering only the autocracies, is still positive, however, only in
the short-run. In addition, the magnitude of the response is lower compared to the PGRIFS
when all countries are considered (Panel A). This fact suggests that oil share has a higher
positive effect on economic growth in democratic rather than in autocratic countries. Similarly,
a positive shock to economic growth is not translated into a positive response from the oil
share of the autocracies, as evident by the insignificant response of INTER 1 to a per capita
real GDP growth shock. Even though we do not report a negative relationship between oil
share and economic growth for the non-democratic countries (as in Sachs and Warner, 1999,
2001; Gylfason et al., 1999; Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999), this finding allows us to confirm the
resource curse hypothesis and the role of the institutions in explaining the oil dependence and
economic growth relationship (as in Isham et al., 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006a,b). Although the
findings for the resource curse hypothesis have been previously reported, we also show for the
first time that the reverse causality is still evident, yet only for democracies. Thus, the role
of institutions in explaining the positive significant relationship from economic growth to oil
rents adds a new channel through which institutions should be considered when analysing the
resource curse hypothesis.
Next, we assess whether the results are different when we take into consideration the degree
of constraints on the executive (as approximated by the xrreg variable; as defined in Table 2).
As aforementioned, this is a rather important innovation of this study, as constraints to the
executives could ”force” an autocratic regime to exhibit democratic traits.
To capture the effects of these constraints we employ our interaction term (INTER 1; as
defined in Table 2). The results are reported in Panel C of Figure 1. We notice, that the
response of the economic growth to a positive shock to oil share, given an autocracy with
high constraints on the executive (INTER 1), is of higher magnitude compared to the response
in Panel B. However, the effect is of lower magnitude (and limited to a shorter time period)
than the obtained in Panel A, suggesting again that the positive relationship between oil share
and economic growth is higher for democratic countries and countries with constraints to the
executive. This result justifies again the inclusion of quality of institutions as a channel through
which oil rents may influence economic growth (Mehlum et al., 2006a,b). In addition, the oil
share for those autocracies with high constraints to the executive responds positively (although
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only in the short-run) to an economic shock, as evident by the right PGIRF of Panel C.
3.3 Panel Generalised Impulse Response Functions: Subgroup analysis
In this section we analyse the robustness of our results by means of estimating previous specifi-
cations of the PVAR for different subgroups of countries (as classified in Table 1).
First, we estimate the PVAR model for developing and developed countries, and display the
results in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. As shown in the Panels A of Figures 2 and 3, oil share
leads to higher growth in both developing and developed countries, although this effect is of a
lower magnitude for the developed countries (see left PGIRFs of Panels A of Figures 2 and 3).
This is rather expected given that the oil sector in the developed countries may not be a key
sector for the economic, whereas the reverse is true for the developing economics. Indicatively,
the oil revenues in Venezuela account for about 25% of the countrys GDP and 95% of its exports,
whereas for the UK, the same ratios are about 1.2
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Again, when we focus only on the autocratic countries we find that oil share does not have
any effect on the economic growth of autocracies in developing countries (see left PGIRF in Panel
B of Figure 2), however; a short-run positive response is evident for the autocratic developed
countries (see left PGIRF in Panel B of Figure 3). In addition, we observe no significant response
from the oil share in the autocratic developing countries to positive economic shocks, whereas
a marginal and extremely short-run positive response is observed for the autocratic developed
economies (see right PGIRFS in Panels C of Figures 2 and 3). Once again when we consider
the constraints to the executives (see Panels C of Figures 2 and 3) we observe for the case of the
autocratic developing economies that there is indeed a positive response of the economic growth
to a positive shock of the oil share. Thus, we show again that in the case developing economies
with autocratic regimes and low constraints to the executives the resource curve is evident. We
should highlight here again that it is important to consider the constraints to the executives in
this line of research, as simply distinguishing between autocratic and democratic regimes, does
not reveal the full dynamics of the relationship between oil dependence and economic growth.
Finally, we control for the income group (low/medium-low, medium-high and high income
countries) when analysing the resource curse hypothesis. The results are shown in Figures 4, 5
and 6.
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[Insert Figure 4 about here]
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
We find evidence of heterogeneous responses among the different income groups. In particu-
lar, there is no significant relationship between oil share and economic growth in the low/medium-
low income group and this finding is robust even when we consider only the autocratic countries
or the interaction term (see Figure 4).
Turning to the medium-high income group of countries we document that the positive long
run effects of oil share are mainly driven by democratic countries (left PGIRFs in Panels A and
B in Figure 5) or by autocracies that have in place significant constraints to the executive (see
left PGIRF in Panel C of Figure 5). The reverse causality (i.e. from the economic growth to oil
share) does not exist for this income group.
More importantly, we find bidirectional relationship between oil share and economic growth
for the high-income countries group, although these effects are short-lived. This finding holds
true for all specifications (see PGIRFs of Figure 6.
Overall, our results suggest that controlling for the quality of political institutions, and
more importantly the constraints to the executives is important in rendering the resource curse
hypothesis significant. Doing so, the resource curse hypothesis is documented mainly for de-
veloping economies and medium-high income countries. Specifically, when economies from the
aforementioned groups are characterised by weak quality of political institutions (autocracies
with limited constraints to the executive), oil dependence is not growth-enhancing. This might
suggest that these autocrats or the political elite exploit the benefits of the country’s oil resources
to accommodate their own rent-seeking behaviour, without considering the potential positive
long-run benefits to the wider economy.10 Gylfason (2001), for example, argues that nations that
consider their natural resources to be their most important asset may neglect the development
of other resources, such as education. However, the existence of high-quality institutions (those
able to create positive incentives for entrepreneurial growth) is crucial to translate the benefits
from oil to productive activities (Mehlum et al., 2006a,b).
10Last but not least, our main results are robust to different proxies of oil dependence, economic growth (growth
rates, GDP per capita growth, 5-year period growth rates) and quality of political institutions (polity index and
the freedom house political rights index). For the sake of brevity we do not report these results, which are,
however, available upon request from the authors.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper we shed more light to the contested literature on the resource curse hypothesis, by
estimating a PVAR approach along with PGIRFs to data on oil dependence, economic growth
and several political institutional variables for 76 countries grouped under different income
groupings and level of development, over the period 1980-2012. To our knowledge, this is the
first paper that adopts a PVAR and PGIRFs analyses, to study the impact of oil dependence
on economic growth taking into account the endogeneity of institutional quality, as well as
controlling for commonly used indicators in the growth literature in order to shed more light
into the natural resource curse hypothesis. The use of this methodology allow us to control for
cross-country unobservable heterogeneity, account for time fixed-effects, analyse the dynamic
relationship between the different variables, and most importantly, to address the endogeneity
problem often found in these type of studies. Furthermore, it is the first study to consider how
the constraints to the executives could influence the relationship between oil dependence and
economic growth.
The results of our empirical analysis reveal the following regularities. First, we document
the need of considering per capita real GDP growth, oil dependence and quality institutions as
endogenous variables, which justifies the use of panel VAR models in analyzing the relationship
between these variables. Second, we find significant evidence that positive oil share shocks are
growth-enhancing, when we do not account for institutional quality, suggesting thus, evidence
against the resource curse hypothesis in that case. Third, controlling for the quality of political
institutions seems important in rendering the resource curse hypothesis significant. Doing so,
the resource curse hypothesis is documented mainly for developing economies and medium-high
income countries. Specifically, when economies from the aforementioned groups are characterised
by weak quality of political institutions, then oil dependence is not growth-enhancing.
These results are robust to different proxies of oil dependence, economic growth (overall
GDP growth, 5-year period growth rates) and quality of political institutions (polity index and
the freedom house political rights index).
Overall, our findings, based on the suggested dynamic approach that deals with a number of
issues in the estimation process, provide new insights in the resource curse hypothesis. Moreover,
our analysis shows that the resource curse hypothesis is mainly driven by the quality of political
institutions, but more importantly, the constraints imposed to the executives. This suggests
that the natural resource hypothesis hold true for autocracies with limited constraints to the
14
executive.
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Table 1: Countries included in the sample
Panel A: Income Groups
Low and Medium-Low Income
Bangladesh Bolivia Cameroon Congo Brazzaville
Congo (Dem Rep) Egypt Ghana Guatemala
India Indonesia Nigeria Pakistan
Paraguay Philippines Syria Vietnam
Yemen
Medium-High Income
Albania Algeria Angola Argentina
Bulgaria China Colombia Cuba
Dominican Rep Ecuador Gabon Hungary
Iran Iraq Jordan Libya
Malaysia Mexico Peru Romania
Thailand Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey
Venezuela
High Income
Australia Austria Bahrain Belgium
Brazil Canada Chile Denmark
Finland France Germany Greece
Ireland Israel Italy Japan
Kuwait New Zealand Norway Netherlands
Oman Poland Portugal Qatar
Korea South Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore
Spain Sweden Switzerland United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom United States
Panel B: Level of Development
Developed
Australia Austria Bahrain Belgium
Canada Chile Denmark Finland
France Germany Greece Ireland
Israel Italy Japan Kuwait
New Zealand Norway Netherlands Oman
Poland Portugal Qatar Korea South
Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Spain
Sweden Switzerland Trinidad and Tobago United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom United States
Developing
Albania Algeria Angola Argentina
Bangladesh Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria
Cameroon China Colombia Congo Brazzaville
Congo (Dem Rep) Cuba Dominican Rep Ecuador
Egypt Gabon Ghana Guatemala
Hungary India Indonesia Iran
Iraq Jordan Libya Malaysia
Mexico Nigeria Pakistan Paraguay
Peru Philippines Romania Syria
Thailand Tunisia Turkey Venezuela
Vietnam Yemen
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Table 1: Countries included in the sample (cont.)
Panel C: Level of Democracy
Democracies
Albania Algeria Argentina Australia
Austria Belgium Bangladesh Bolivia
Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile
Colombia Congo (Dem Rep) Denmark Dominican Rep
Ecuador Finland France Gabon
Germany Ghana Greece Guatemala
Hungary India Indonesia Ireland
Iraq Israel Italy Japan
Malaysia Mexico New Zealand Nigeria
Norway Netherlands Pakistan Paraguay
Peru Philippines Poland Portugal
Korea South Romania Russia Spain
Sweden Switzerland Thailand Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey United Kingdom United States
Non-Democracies
Angola Bahrain Cameroon China
Congo Brazzaville Cuba Egypt Iran
Jordan Kuwait Libya Oman
Qatar Saudi Arabia Singapore Syria
Tunisia United Arab Emirates Venezuela Vietnam
Yemen
Note: The income-country groupings, as well as, the grouping between developed and developing are based on
the World Bank and United Nations classifications, respectively.
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Table 2: Variable description and sources
Name Description Source Notes
Economic Growth rate of real per IMF Log difference of per capita GDP (in PPP,
Growth capita GDP (GDPPCGR) constant 2005 intnl $)
Oil rents Oil rents (as % of GDP) World Bank Difference between the value of crude oil
production at world prices and total costs
of production
Oil share Oil share (as % of GDP) IMF, EIA Value of crude oil exports as % of GDP.
Oil revenue Oil revenue per capita IMF, EIA Value of crude oil exports per capita
Polity IV Rating based on a +10 Polity IV Substracting the AUTOC score from the
(strongly democratic) to project DEMOC score in the Polity IV database
-10 (strongly autocratic)
scale
Xrreg Rating based on a 1 to 3 Polity IV It is a component of the Polity IV index, and
scale project measures the “Regulation of Chief Executive
Recruitment” mechanism
Political Rating based on a 1 to 7 Freedom The ratings process is based on a checklist of
rights scale House 10political rights questions related to the
electoral process, political pluralism and
participation and functioning of government
Democracy Dummy variable Polity IV Countries are classified according to the
status project Polity IV index in democracies (Polity IV
scores between 6 and 10), and anocracies/
autocracies (Polity IV scores between -10
and 5)
Xrred Interactive term IMF, EIA, Calculated as the product of Xrreg
× (INTER 1) Polity IV and Oil share
Oil share
Developing Category World Bank Countries are classified according to their degree
of development, based on World Bank data
GFCF Gross fixed capital World Bank Expressed as percentage of GDP
formation
Trade openness Trade openness World Bank The sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP
LPFR Labour force World Bank Expressed as a percentage of total population of ages
participation rate 15+
Note: Annual data from 76 countries for the period 1980-2012.
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Table 3: Block exogeneity/Granger-causality tests
Dependent variable
Economic growth Oil share INTER 1
rate
Economic growth 11.55** 3.40
rate (excluded)
Oil share (excluded) 16.38*** 13.55***
INTER 1 (excluded) 10.04** 6.19
All variables 28.34*** 17.44** 15.17*
Note: The numbers in the table are the Chi-square block exogeneity Wald tests. Under the null hypothesis, the
excluded variables do not Granger-cause the dependent variable. *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Mean Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis J-B LLC
GDPPCGR 1.6688 -43.0161 40.5673 4.5809 -1.2640 14.4295 13194.21* -20.93*
OIL SHARE 8.4982 0.0000 98.8086 14.4599 3.0219 14.0225 9685.52* -28.07*
OIL RENT 10.0863 0.0000 80.2375 14.9963 1.8375 5.8979 1852.66* -24.53*
OIL REVENUE 8.4171 0.0001 245.0232 20.1332 5.8563 50.3884 154090.8* -27.17*
GFCF 21.9134 2.1000 59.7324 6.1869 0.5755 5.2960 618.13* -4.80*
OPENESS 72.0425 6.3203 439.6567 49.4087 3.1378 18.3525 26877.76* -39.86*
LPFR 59.8670 15 86.7 9.5022 -0.2659 3.3369 41.4322* -5.61*
Note: * denotes significance at the 1% level. J-B denotes the Jarque-Bera test for normality. LLC is the panel
unit root test (with just a constant) of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), which test the null hypothesis of a unit root,
against the alternative that the panel is stationary.
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions: Full sample
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions: Developing
Panel A: All Countries 
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions: Developed
Panel A: All Countries 
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions: Low and Medium-Low Income group
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions: Medium-High Income group
Panel A: All Countries 
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions: High Income group
Panel A: All Countries 
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